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Following
the Money:
The ACA’s
Fiscal-Political
Economy and
Lessons for
Future Health
Care Reform
William M. Sage and
Timothy M. Westmoreland

Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is founded more on
pragmatism than on abstract principles. Eschewing the language of individual rights, or even social
solidarity, the law built incrementally on the existing
health care system while primarily articulating goals
of consumer choice and affordability. The ACA was
undeniably ambitious, reaching health care services
and underlying health as well as health insurance, but
that ambition was wrapped in brown paper packaging that concealed its breadth and internal logic. Even,
sometimes, from its proponents and defenders.
Cynics — known also as Washingtonians — will tell
you to “follow the money” when tracking what federal
laws contain and omit. Often, that refers to the corporate and interest-group stakeholders whose livelihoods
depend on existing arrangements and who demand
to be insulated from change. Occasionally, following
the money refers to new or established constituencies
who profit from legislated redistribution. The political economy of the ACA features both phenomena:
the private insurance ecosystem was protected, while
hospitals and physicians anticipated a reduction in
non-paying patients as more of the population gained
subsidized coverage.
But to understand where the project of national
health reform finds itself today, one must “follow the
money” in a different way. Consider the conventional
wisdom on the “unsupportable cost” of Medicare-forAll. Imagine replacing the ACA with a system in which
most beneficiaries participate in private Medicare
Advantage plans rather than fee-for-service Medicare (which seems plausible). Under the ACA, money
from individuals pays health plans for coverage; plans
in turn pay providers for care. In the new system, the
money would start and end in the same places (coming from individuals and going to providers), travel
through the same intermediaries (plans), and be spent
for the same thing (coverage). What would change is
what we call the money as it is transferred. “Individual
premiums” would seem to disappear and “taxes” and
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edly, even if net costs remain the same. In Congress,
Medicare-for-All might stand or fall on that labeling
distinction.
It is no exaggeration to say that American health
policy is frequently subordinated to budgetary policies and procedures.1 The original enactment of Medicare and Medicaid largely escaped this fate because it
predated federal budget control legislation. Since the
1970s, however, health care reforms (and many other
bills) have had to pass Congress twice: once on their
merits and again on their perceived impact on the
federal budget. Indeed, the fiscal-political economy of

This article examines the ACA as a major example
of the effect of forcing health policy into the Procrustean limits of pre-ordained budget targets and structures. One must wonder how comprehensive health
insurance for all Americans came to be subject to such
strictures. In the 2017 tax legislation, by contrast, the
Congress added more to the national debt than the
ACA’s entire estimated gross cost (before savings and
revenue offsets reduced its net cost to zero). Recently,
the Congress spent as much money for one year of
COVID-19 response as the ACA was estimated to cost
over ten years (again before offsets to zero). The aban-

American health policy is frequently subordinated to budgetary policies
and procedures. … Since the 1970s, health care reforms (and many other
bills) have had to pass Congress twice: once on their merits and again on
their perceived impact on the federal budget. Indeed, the fiscal-political
economy of the ACA closely tracks what has become an increasingly contrived
distinction between public and private money.
the ACA closely tracks what has become an increasingly contrived distinction between public and private
money.2
That fiscal politics determined the ACA’s design
and guided its implementation, as well as sometimes
assisting and sometimes constraining efforts to repeal
or replace it, has gone largely undiscussed. The ACA’s
vulnerability to litigation has been an evident price its
drafters paid in exchange for fiscal-political acceptability. There are deeper issues as well. Fiscal politics
accentuated and perpetuated the U.S. health care
system’s tendency to “launder” public investments
through private entities subject to market incentives
and professional, self-regulatory oversight. COVID19 has cast a harsh light on the tenuous connection
between our financially overstuffed medical care
industry and effective preparedness and response at
the community and population levels. Virus testing
has been a critical failure point, with lack of availability through public health departments and failures of coordination among provider offices, clinics,
hospitals, and commercial labs. Other problems have
involved supply chains, surge capacity, and allocating
resources under conditions of physical scarcity. Most
profoundly, trained staff and advanced facilities that
should be valuable health care resources for the nation
have been financially stressed and even sidelined by
precipitous drops in revenue from “private payers.”

donment of budget limits for COVID-19 legislation
was a virtually unanimous decision and not one that
we dispute. Evaluating with the benefit of hindsight
the consequences of applying budget limits to the
ACA raises important questions about whether future
comprehensive health reforms should be similarly
restricted.

Basics of Fiscal Policy and Politics
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 (Budget Act) created the modern congressional budget process.3 Since then, amendments to
the Budget Act have capped spending, skewed taxes,
imposed across-the-board cuts, and — briefly — balanced budgets. Budget rules have been variously
observed, waived, disregarded, allowed to expire,
renewed, or enforced with a vengeance. Over time,
the focus has largely turned away from the amounts
of the deficit and the debt and toward the constraints
that Congress has placed on itself.4 Meanwhile, federal spending has increased substantially, with health
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid the major
sources of growth.
Congress has increasingly turned to the budget
process as a way of sidestepping a Senate filibuster, a
legislative stalling tactic that can be ended only if 60
senators agree. Senate rules make an exception to the
filibuster for consideration of the budget, demonstrating its legislative primacy. This makes the budget an
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almost irresistible vehicle for acting on any controversial measure.5 Senate rules also define what constitutes a budget item — essentially a change to mandatory spending or revenues — and disallow anything
else. In turn, this alters the legislative and political
calculus, privileging money measures and consigning
all other provisions to endless waiting.
Federal budgets are divided into discretionary
spending, mandatory spending, and tax spending.6
For budget and legal purposes, it is presumed that discretionary spending will not be renewed unless Congress acts to do so, generally through annual appropriations. By contrast, mandatory spending is money
that has been promised in a permanent provision of
law; Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are the
largest mandatory spending programs. Tax spending
(through deductions, credits, exclusions, etc.) is revenue that is forgone by the federal government for a
specific reason. Tax spending has grown to be larger
than all of discretionary spending (at least before
COVID-19), but it is rarely listed as part of the federal
budget.
While both mandatory spending and tax spending
are generally based in permanent law, the amount of
money needed to meet these statutory obligations will
vary from year to year. A model known as the “baseline” projects what current law requires be spent in
the future, with Congress relying on the nonpartisan
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The baseline is
required to be built on the assumption that current
statutory provisions will be implemented as written, however unlikely that may seem from a political
perspective. The baseline projects program costs and
revenues, as well as the annual federal deficit and the
cumulative federal debt, and generally includes the
coming year and nine years into the future (the “tenyear snapshot”).7
Congress has adopted progressively stricter procedural and statutory limits on its own ability to increase
spending or cut taxes. For discretionary spending,
Congress has created an annual global cap; no new
spending for one program can be provided unless
other programs are cut from their previous levels.
Legislation that would exceed the cap is not “in order;”
this objection can be waived, but doing so can incite
opposition from both those opposed to the substantive
legislation and those who are committed to budget
restraint. There is also a statutory doomsday machine
— the sequester — that requires the OMB to impose
across-the-board, pro rata cuts in most appropriated
programs to bring total discretionary spending down
to the cap.
For mandatory spending, Congress adopted the
“Pay-as-You-go” (PAYGO) requirement, a parliamen436

tary rule prohibiting the consideration of any mandatory spending or revenue legislation that would make
the deficit worse. Since 2010, PAYGO has also been
enforced by a statutory sequester mechanism: at the
end of each year, the OMB adds up the costs of all new
mandatory spending and revenues and subtracts any
offsetting savings. If all such legislation in the aggregate
is projected to add to the deficit, the OMB is required
to impose across-the-board cuts. Several programs are
exempted (e.g., Social Security, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program) while others have
limits on cuts (notably no more than 4% of Medicare).
Because recent Congresses have been extremely reluctant to raise taxes, PAYGO requirements have been
met mainly by cutting existing mandatory spending
programs, in essence robbing Peter to finance Paul.
To make the PAYGO limits workable, how new
legislation affects baseline commitments must be
estimated. This “scorekeeping” is done by the CBO
(sometimes in tandem with the Joint Committee
on Taxation). Although the CBO does credible work
under intense pressure, no one (including the CBO)
believes that its scores will ultimately be borne out as
correct over time. The CBO score is akin to an umpire’s
call in a sporting event: It is deemed to be right and is
accepted by participants so that the action can go on.
This formalistic process is nonetheless central to
the prospects of nearly all health care legislation. Consider, for example, the comprehensive tobacco control
legislation passed in 2009 after decades of biomedical research and public health advocacy.8 Division A of
the law deals with “Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control;” Division B deals with “Federal Retirement
Reform.” Assume that Division A would have been
effective at decreasing smoking. Taken alone, however, Division A would not have been enacted because
a reduction in smoking would reduce federal tax
receipts on tobacco products without significantly
reducing federal Medicaid costs within the relevant
10-year time frame.9 Fortunately, an experienced
House committee chair noticed that an unrelated
bill had been filed to expand tax-favored retirement
options by permitting the equivalent of “Roth IRAs”
for federal workers. This bill had been scored favorably — though economically equivalent, paying tax
at deposit rather than at withdrawal brought more
revenues into the ten-year snapshot. Designating the
second bill as Division B of the Tobacco Control Act
kept the overall legislation in the black as a technical
matter, enabling its passage.10
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The ACA’S Fiscal Design and
Implementation
Retention of “Private” Insurance: It is universally
recognized that the United States spends more private money per person on health care than any other
nation. It is seldom appreciated that the United States
also spends more public money per person on health
care than any other nation (OECD data).11 Moreover,
public and private health care expenditures in the U.S.
are largely overlapping (e.g., hospital care is funded
with public dollars for some people and private dollars for others), unlike countries with explicitly public systems in which private spending is typically for
different services in alternative settings. Fiscal characterization, not substance, distinguishes most public from private spending — a fact best illustrated by
the roughly $300 billion annually in forgone revenue
to the U.S. treasury because earnings paid by private
employers as health coverage rather than wages are
exempt from income tax.12 This tax expenditure is
incompletely captured in government accounting and,
prior to the ACA, blinded most workers to the full cost
of their benefits because individual reporting to the
IRS was not required.
Keeping the costs of the health care system off public ledgers was a primary design principle of the ACA.
There were many reasons that employer-sponsored
insurance had political appeal as part of the ACA (e.g.,
“If you like the plan you have, you can keep it.”).13 But
at least one major motivation for its retention as the
framework of the ACA was to avoid the appearance in
bookkeeping of transmogrifying vast amounts of private spending into public spending. In this respect, the
ACA continued a tradition of cloaking health reforms
in the language of private competition, regardless of
whether such competition was likely. The Clinton
administration’s Health Security Act took this to its
extreme, combining a global budgeting process with
an employer-based managed competition framework
in the hope that CBO would credit the global budgets
for capping potential costs (which it did) but consider
the mandatory flow of funds through employers to
be premiums rather than payroll taxes (which it did
not).14 Had the Clinton bill been enacted, it seems
probable that global budgets, once surpassed, would
have been deferred by future Congresses in a ritual
of annual hypocrisy not unlike the persistent nonenforcement of the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR)
for physician payment under Medicare.
Budget Commitments: One might argue that the
ACA could not have become law had the Great Recession not shortly preceded its enactment. The reality
of recession influenced voters in the 2008 presidential election, bringing “health security” once again

onto the domestic policy agenda. Economic stimulus
also provided fiscal “activation energy” for health care
reform, both directly and by blunting legislators’ concerns about short-term budgetary effects. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),
for example, included $149 billion for health care.15
But Congressional tolerance for additional public spending was not unlimited. Leadership assured
members that that the ACA would be required to comply with both parliamentary and statutory PAYGO
rules, implying no net increase in the budget baseline.
The legislation also had to fulfill a political promise
made by President Obama that total expenditures
would not exceed approximately $900 billion over ten
years, regardless of offsetting cuts and new revenues.16
This pledge, perhaps unnecessary, ensured that CBO
scorekeeping would have a primary role throughout
the congressional debate.
Individual Mandate: The ACA’s “individual mandate” to purchase health coverage did not originate
with progressive policymakers but with conservative
commentators, who preferred personal responsibility as an obligation of citizenship to what they considered the free-rider-encouraging, potentially jobkilling effects of burdening private businesses through
an “employer mandate” — the Clinton plan’s centerpiece.17 But it was an employer mandate’s fiscal consequences, not its arguable employment effects, that
rendered it a non-starter in the ACA. The final nail
in the coffin of the Clinton plan was the CBO’s decision in 1994 to regard the employer mandate as an
exercise of sovereign power, and therefore to score the
proposal as massively increasing both taxes and government spending. Roughly half of the U.S. population — 150 million people — typically receives health
coverage through employment. Regardless of its effect
on the uninsured, an employer mandate placed in the
ACA would likely have been scored by the CBO as
increasing the annual federal tax burden by over $1.5
trillion. By contrast, individually purchased insurance
would cover only about 20 million people, reducing
the necessary budget offsets to $200 billion even if the
CBO applied a similar analysis (it did not). The ACA’s
limited employer obligations are backstop provisions
mainly intended to prevent free-riding on subsidized
public coverage, and did not threaten CBO scoring.
Medicaid Expansion: The ACA’s dramatic expansion of Medicaid to include all poor Americans not
otherwise insured — including individuals that many
conservative states had declined previously to cover
— represents one of the law’s two most direct commitments of substantial public funds. The other large,
explicit public expenditure consists of refundable tax
credits for the purchase of commercial health insur-
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ance by lower-income Americans not made eligible for
Medicaid. During congressional debate, however, fiscal criteria tipped the scales toward Medicaid. Because
administrative costs are less and provider payments
are lower, CBO scores the cost of an additional Medicaid beneficiary more favorably than a heavily subsidized purchaser of marketplace insurance. To hit fiscal targets, Congress twice increased the income limits
for the Medicaid expansion, including a last-minute
amendment that added another 5% — explaining why
some summaries of the ACA cap eligibility at 133% of
the federal poverty line, while others cite 138%.18 The
overall price-tag of the Medicaid provisions eventually made it necessary, largely for budgetary reasons,
to require state financial participation in the form of
matching payments, which in turn led to litigation
that almost declared the expansion unconstitutional
(see below).
Phase-In of Major Provisions: Changes made by
the ACA to the U.S. health care system may have been
substantial, but they also were slow to start. President
Obama signed the bill into law on March 23, 2010, but
the ACA’s major provisions expanding Medicaid and
reconfiguring and subsidizing individually purchased
insurance did not become fully effective until 2014.
Some of the delay was inevitable: the Department of
Health & Human Services had to draft and issue a
very large number of implementing regulations, and
the health insurance and health care industries had
to adjust their business models to the new requirements and incentives. But a prolonged phase-in also
serendipitously served fiscal politics by placing fewer
years of full operation within the CBO scorekeeping window, proportionately decreasing the ACA’s
projected overall cost. This came at a political price:
opponents of the law had a much easier time mustering their arguments and mounting litigation when a
system was not yet in place and the public did not yet
understand what the law contained or how they might
benefit from it.
Community-Based Long-Term Care: Democrats
in Congress did not embrace a comprehensive singlepayer national health insurance as Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), who died of brain cancer in the first
year of the Obama presidency, would have wished. Congress did, however, incorporate one of Kennedy’s last
legislative causes into the ACA: the so-called CLASS
Act creating a program of subsidized long-term-care
insurance to fund services outside of nursing homes.
In fiscal terms, the CLASS Act required 5 years of voluntary (i.e., non-tax) contributions for individuals to
vest, pushing nearly all payouts beyond the scoring
window and appearing to reduce the ACA’s projected
budget impact by $87 billion.19 Having helped secure
438

the ACA’s passage in 2010, the CLASS Act was unceremoniously repealed in 2013, its negative long-term
fiscal impact having been clearly revealed simply by
time rolling forward into a new scoring window.
Budget Reconciliation and the Byrd Rule: Perhaps the most pervasive effect of the Budget Act on
the ACA’s ultimate wording resulted from budget
reconciliation processes. After House passage of one
version of a bill and Senate passage of a different version, the expectation would be for the two bodies to
confer. But the loss of Senator Kennedy’s 60th vote in
the Senate forced negotiations into the form of a budget package in order to avoid a filibuster. Only compromises that produced a direct change in revenues
or outlays could be considered; other measures were
barred by the Byrd Rule. Even the clean-up of inadvertent drafting errors was procedurally precluded. It
is unlikely that “regular order” would have produced
a perfectly drafted law, but Budget Act restrictions
made mistakes unavoidable. As described next, some
would come back to haunt health reform in court.

The ACA’S Fiscal Economy Meets the
Supreme Court
Dozens of lawsuits have been filed against the ACA,
with three already generating decisions from the
United States Supreme Court and more on their way.20
Unlike challenges to the Social Security system during the Great Depression, the incidence of litigation
did not abate after initial uncertainties regarding the
ACA’s constitutionality were resolved by the courts.
Maneuvering under the Budget Act was a major contributor to this legal morass. For fiscal reasons, the
ACA allocated to potentially litigious states and private parties obligations more intuitively lodged in federal agencies and deployed convoluted and therefore
contestable procedures made necessary by that apportionment of financial responsibility.
NFIB v. Sebelius (2012): It is well known that Chief
Justice John Roberts “saved” the ACA from constitutional nullification in its first trip to the Supreme
Court by recasting its two principal mechanisms for
reducing the number of uninsured Americans — the
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion —
to avoid compelling individuals or coercing states in
excess of his view of federal powers.21 Neither would
have been necessary absent budget constraints during the law’s consideration and enactment. Had the
federal government assumed the full cost of the Medicaid expansion, states would have had neither public rationale nor legal standing to sue. But hitting the
declared budget targets drove Democrats in Congress
to place 10% of long-term matching requirements on
the states, a fiscal need enhanced by the CBO-scoringjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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induced shift of more beneficiaries from tax-subsidized private insurance to Medicaid. This gave seven
members of the Court grounds to rule that the threat
of withholding all Medicaid funds from states that
refused to bear this burden would violate the Tenth
Amendment.
Obligating individuals to purchase private coverage
also offended a majority of the Justices, who opined
that Congress’s power to regulate commerce did not
permit Congress to compel commercial activity. Direct
government funding of coverage through taxation
would have rendered this mechanism unnecessary,
lending a touch of irony to the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the penalty for declining to purchase insurance was properly considered a tax and therefore that
the private coverage provisions were within Congress’s
Article I authority.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014): Although the ACA’s
imposition of an individual rather than an employer
mandate avoided most newly regulated private coverage being scored as taxation, the law placed other
obligations on private employers that provoked litigation. Chief among these has been the requirement that
most employer-sponsored coverage offer “essential
health benefits,” including no-cost contraception as a
preventive health service. Not surprisingly, mandating
contraceptive benefits has been controversial among
employers with religious objections, with the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) providing
a legal vehicle for their grievances.
In the Hobby Lobby case, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority conferred standing on closely held
corporations with sincerely held religious beliefs, an
unexpected expansion of RFRA.22 In another touch
of fiscal irony, the Court asserted that the ACA failed
to use the least restrictive alternative to achieve its
goal, as contraceptive coverage could have been publicly funded. The Obama administration subsequently
attempted to reach an accommodation with employers
that maintained contraceptive access, an approach the
Trump administration summarily reversed. Both positions prompted significant litigation, some of which is
ongoing and none of which would have occurred in a
publicly funded system as there is no RFRA-relevant
alternative to raising general revenues and giving
grants and subsidies.23
King v. Burwell (2015): In King, the ACA survived
another near-death experience in the courts, though
one without a constitutional dimension.24 The dispute
focused on poorly drafted language in the statute suggesting that federal income tax subsidies were unavailable to persons buying individual coverage in states that
refused to establish their own insurance exchanges and
who were relying on the federal exchange by default.

The plaintiffs’ standing was based on their desire not to
receive subsidies so that they could be exempt from the
individual mandate. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument, but it highlights the litigation risk created
by the ACA’s Rube-Goldberg-like financing mechanisms. A more direct, tax-funded, nationally administered system would have been less challengeable in
court. Moreover, the limitations of budget reconciliation rules and the absence of a House-Senate conference increased the risk of such a drafting error remaining uncorrected.

Fiscal Influences on ACA “Repeal and
Replace”
Political opposition to the ACA is generally credited
for returning the House of Representatives to Republican control in the 2010 midterm elections, much as
opposition to the Clinton health plan had done for
both houses of Congress in 1994. In each instance,
longstanding partisan divides on fiscal issues such
as taxation, government spending, and redistribution mixed with concerns about specific health policies to generate new majority legislative agendas. In
2016, the Republicans added control of the Senate
and White House, with ACA “repeal and replacement”
an explicit and urgent campaign promise they were
eager to fulfill. At the same time, the siren call of tax
cuts and the related temptation to redirect permanent
spending overcame partisanship for legislators on
both sides of the aisle, putting at risk important features of the ACA.
But the rules and processes of the Budget Act
complicated the actions of the ACA’s opponents during repeal as they had those of its supporters during
enactment. Reconciliation in particular limited the
measures available to Republican legislators seeking
to undo the ACA’s core provisions. Spending and taxes
are permitted in a budget package; insurance reforms
and regulatory standards are not. A simple repeal of
the ACA would have involved laws that had no effect on
outlays or revenues and would have been ruled out of
order in the Senate and thus subject to filibuster. Politicians who had campaigned that they would uproot
the ACA found themselves able only to trim selected
branches. Ultimately, this left ACA opponents without even a majority in the Senate, as confirmed in July
2017 by Senator John McCain’s dramatic, late-night
thumbs-down vote on so-called “skinny repeal.”25
Even more basically, the ACA’s passage altered the
fiscal terrain on which these battles would be fought.
The ACA, its spending, and its revenues and savings
were now included in the baseline for CBO scorekeeping. “Repeal and replace” would be measured against
this reset baseline, creating a CBO price tag for pro-
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posed legislation. Moreover, highly visible CBO projections included both dollars saved and people rendered uninsured, because the budget effects could not
be calculated without estimating how reducing penalties and subsidies would affect private decisions to
obtain coverage.
Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF):
Intended as a dramatic and permanent investment in
population health — long the poor stepchild of acute
care — the PPHF received an initial allocation of $500
million in mandatory spending, with programmed
increases to $2 billion annually by 2015.26 Beginning in 2012, however, successive pieces of essentially
bipartisan legislation raided the PPHF for other purposes such as reforming the SGR, reauthorizing the
Children’s Health Insurance Program, and enacting
the 21st Century Cures Act. After further cuts in the
2017 Republican tax reform bill, the PPHF was left

Obama Administration took the position that the
funding for these “cost-sharing reduction payments”
was intended to be mandatory spending. The Republican-controlled House of Representatives filed suit,
arguing that it was discretionary spending that had
not been appropriated and therefore was not available. As with King, ambiguous or mistaken drafting
likely resulted from the constraints of budget reconciliation. In 2016, a federal district court ruled that the
Republican House had legal standing to sue.27 The litigation was settled in 2017, with the payments becoming discretionary. When the Trump administration
eventually ceased payments, however, several insurers brought their own lawsuits for the denied funds,
with some prevailing and others still pending in court.
With repayment foreclosed, insurers also “loaded” the
cost-sharing amounts into the premiums charged to
Silver Plan enrollees. Because the ACA more broadly

The ACA was the first universal coverage legislation to become law
after a hundred years of trying. But its reliance on the definitions,
scorekeeping artifacts, and arcane parliamentary rules of the Congressional
budget process has come — dare we say it? — at a cost. Fiscalizing the
legislative debate created ambiguities to be litigated and conferred standing
on unlikely plaintiffs. This placed much of the ACA at the mercy of the
judiciary, which is the branch of government least able to assess either health
effects or budget impacts. A more straightforward legislative approach
akin to Social Security and Medicare, while fraught in its fiscal politics,
might have produced a less confusing and less precarious result.
with roughly $1 billion annually, hardly a paltry sum
but far less than intended. In retrospect, fiscal rules
caused the original strategy to misfire. By designating
the PPHF as mandatory spending, the ACA’s drafters
created a supposedly reliable funding base for public
health and avoided the risk of politically motivated
refusals to appropriate funds. However, the infusion
of mandatory funding reset the spending baseline
and painted a target on the PPHF’s back as a source
of long-term budgetary offsets for unrelated spending
increases and revenue cuts.
Cost-sharing Reduction Payments and House v.
Burwell: Perhaps no provision of the ACA has been
more affected by fiscal ambiguity and associated
maneuvering than the government’s obligation to
reimburse private insurers for cost-sharing amounts
not permitted under law to be charged directly to
low-income purchasers of “Silver”-level coverage. The
440

subsidizes premiums for low-income enrollees than
it does cost-sharing obligations, the net effect was to
increase the ACA’s total cost to the government, an
ironic outcome that a CBO estimate confirmed.28
Shared Responsibility Payments and California
v. Texas: Anticipating a constitutional challenge, the
ACA’s drafters had emphasized in recitals the centrality of the individual mandate to the effectiveness of
the law taken as a whole. Their strategy backfired: the
Supreme Court rejected the Obama administration’s
Commerce Clause argument in NFIB, and four Justices were poised to overturn the entire ACA on the
grounds that once the mandate was held unconstitutional, it could not be severed from the remainder of
the law. This analysis resurfaced in late 2018, when a
conservative District Judge in Dallas ruled that the
2017 Republican tax law setting the “shared responsibility payment” at zero removed the mandate’s conjournal of law, medicine & ethics
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stitutional protection and rendered the entire ACA
invalid.29 Following partial affirmance by a federal
appeals court, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case. When it does, it will resolve what is almost a
metaphysical question about the “intent of Congress.”
Budget reconciliation processes exposed the shared
responsibility payment itself to elimination by simple
majority vote in the Senate, but the remaining language mandating coverage — though now without a
tax penalty to enforce it — was beyond the scope of
budget reconciliation and therefore could not formally be repealed without a 60-vote supermajority.
One might argue that if the Congress had an intent to
repeal the ACA it would have waived or amended the
Budget Act, the Senate Rules, or both. It did not do so.

Lessons and Implications
The ACA was the first universal coverage legislation
to become law after a hundred years of trying. But its
reliance on the definitions, scorekeeping artifacts, and
arcane parliamentary rules of the Congressional budget process has come — dare we say it? — at a cost.
Fiscalizing the legislative debate created ambiguities
to be litigated and conferred standing on unlikely
plaintiffs. This placed much of the ACA at the mercy of
the judiciary, which is the branch of government least
able to assess either health effects or budget impacts.
A more straightforward legislative approach akin to
Social Security and Medicare, while fraught in its fiscal politics, might have produced a less confusing and
less precarious result.
The tyranny of the federal budget is troubling to
those of us who care deeply about health care reform.
Other areas of domestic policymaking do not have
their substantive goals so often subordinated to deficit
targets. The 2009 stimulus package and the 2017 tax
cuts both were scored as adding billions, even trillions,
in red ink to the government’s accounts, but the House
and Senate deemed them necessary for the economy,
sidestepped PAYGO, and passed them intact.
The hard history of the ACA shows that when health
reform is viewed primarily through a budgetary lens,
it is health policy that suffers. Fiscal politics distorts
the process and the goals of legislating — in both predictable and wildly unpredictable ways. Future health
reform deliberations — such as public discussions of
Medicare-for-All — should aspire to greater transparency regarding the artifice of whether a reform
is labeled tax-subsidized “private insurance” or federally provided “public insurance.” Fiscal estimates
should employ measures that account clearly for costs
and savings in all health expenditures, not just those
denominated as on-budget. Long-term investments

should be valued, even if they do not produce returns
within the budget snapshot.
Moreover, budgetary projections should not be the
only metrics. At a minimum, Congress should assess
health legislation by routine analysis of its effects on
illness, life, and death — not just its effects on outlays,
offsets, and debt. It would be possible, for example, for
the CDC as well as the CBO to score most health proposals. A non-partisan evaluation of projected effects
on morbidity and mortality would be valuable to the
political process and likely more meaningful to the
public.
The COVID-19 pandemic shows how dependent the
nation’s financial health can be on its physical health.
Requiring for CBO scorekeeping reasons state financial participation in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion led
to litigation that resulted in a coverage gap between
Medicaid eligibility and subsidized exchange coverage
in non-expansion states.30 This left many suddenly
unemployed Americans with no source of payment
for emergency services, including COVID-19 testing
and treatment, which in turn has required billions in
ad hoc federal spending. Systemic underestimation
of the value of public health infrastructure, including
the evisceration of the ACA’s Prevention and Public
Health Fund, has cost both lives and dollars.
Money may not be limitless, but neither is life
expectancy.
Note
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